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This thesis examines the current state of the U.S. semiconductor industry
in light of its alleged decline relative to foreign producers, specifically Japan,
in the hope that an appropriate federal policy might be identified, based on
current market conditions. Justification for federal intervention into private
sector industry and the appropriate federal intervention methods are
included, leading to a discussion of the national security benefits derived
from a strong domestic semiconductor industry. Various micro federal
government intervention methods are analyzed including a hands off policy,
tariffs, anti-dumping measures, strategic stockpiling, DOD production, a Buy
American policy, subsidized domestic production, and industry consortia.
The goal is to determine how effective they will be in bolstering the U.S.
semiconductor industry. However, the problems in the semiconductor
industry are seen more as macro problems affecting the economy as a whole.
Thus, the recommended intervention policies focus more on macro
solutions including changes to the tax structure to encourage savings and
discourage debt in order to reduce the cost of capital in the U.S. These
solutions will tend to stimulate the economy as a whole, rather than
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According to various high level government and industry experts, the
U.S. semiconductor industry today is at risk of losing its technological
superiority in the global market. Microchips, which are comprised of
integrated circuits containing thousands of electrical components, are now
the key components for computers, telephones, and other consumer
electronic products. The U.S. semiconductor industry accounted for $250
billion of the nation's industrial output in 1986, a full 15% of the total. [Ref.
l:p. 89] In addition to the commercial aspects of semiconductors, they have
become vital to maintaining the U.S. technology lead in weapons systems and
other important military applications. Many discussions concerning
government policies toward the semiconductor industry give the perception
that the defense program, the economy, and the entire industrial base of the
U.S are at risk because all depend on electronic technology leverage which
today is driven by semiconductor technology. [Ref. 2:p. 11]
There are also those who feel that the entire issue is overstated and
exaggerated. They feel that although the U.S. does not still possess the same
share of the global market as it did immediately following World War II, the
U.S. economy is strong and still has about the same share of the world market
as it did in the mid-1960s.
For those who feel that federal intervention in the private sector is
justified in the case of the semiconductor industry, there are many conflicting
schools of thought regarding the appropriate response. On one hand, there
are those who maintain that free international trade will reach its
equilibrium point if left alone. They feel that as international trade is allowed
to occur freely, nations will produce goods and services which benefit each
according to their comparative advantage. [Ref. 3:p. 271 This approach tends
to have a long-term perspective towards solving the problem.
On the other hand, there are others whc maintain that the
semiconductor industry is too important to the U.S. economy and national
security to take a laissez-faire approach. From the government's and the
semiconductor industry's perspective, judging from the Defense Science
Board Task Force Report On Defense Semiconductor Dependency (comprised
of high ranking government officials and representatives of the merchant
semiconductor industry), the time to act is now. They tend to take a more
short-term approach to solving the problem.
B. OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The objective of this thesis is to examine the U.S. semiconductor industry
to determine if sufficient market imperfections exist to justify the
intervention of the federal government in this private sector market and if
so, to examine the appropriate policy responses open to the federal
government. In order to direct this study, the research questions to be
addressed include:
• What is the proper justification for government intervention in
private sector business?
• What methods of intervention should be used to for different market
imperfections?
Is there sufficient justification for the federal government to intervene
in the U.S. semiconductor industry?
If so, what are the appropriate responses?
How successful has federal intervention been in the past?
How important are semiconductor chips to our national security?
What options are open for the federal government to solve the
problem?
How does a long-term approach differ from a short-term approach to
solve the problem?
C SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This thesis is a case study of the semiconductor industry focusing on the
appropriate role for the federal government to play, if government
intervention is justified. The Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM)
microchip sector of the semiconductor industry's market will be emphasized,
since that is the one sector where the U.S. has lost its market share to overseas
competitors over the last several years. While several competitors have
taken part in the overseas shift for DRAM market share, by far the most
dominant competitors are Japanese. For that reason, the Japanese
semiconductor industry and business environment will be emphasized in
this thesis.
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
The remainder of this thesis address the research questions stated above.
Chapter Two will include a general discussion of justification for
intervention into private sector business, a general discussion of appropriate
economic responses when justification is substantiated, a brief history of the
semiconductor industry, and a discussion of past federal intervention into the
semiconductor industry. Chapter Three will include a discussion of the
national security issue that has been tied to a domestic production capability
for the U.S. Chapter Four will include a discussion of a number of micro
options available to the federal government to specifically bolster the U.S.
semiconductor industry. Chapter Five will include a brief look at possible
macro solutions, conclusions, and recommendations for further research and
study.
II. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN THE U.S.
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
A. APPROPRIATE FEDERAL ROLE FOR SEMICONDUCTOR
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
Before determining which type or types of federal incentives would be
most appropriate for the semiconductor industry in the U.S., the issue of
what justification is sufficient for federal participation in the R&D process for
semiconductors must be addressed. Once federal intervention is justified, the
appropriate method of intervention must be matched to the rationale
justifying federal intervention to most efficiently and least expensively
correct the situation.
1. Justification for Federal Intervention
Federal Research and Development (R&D) funds historically have
targeted projects dealing with technology development for public sector use
or basic research, such as problems studied by the National Science
Foundation. In more recent years, however, increasing levels of federal
support have been directed towards the private sector and commercial
applications.
One justification frequently offered for federal support for R&D in the
semiconductor industry is the extremely high capital investment required to
develop new generations of microchips and manufacturing techniques. This
does not necessarily indicate that federal support is justified in the
semiconductor industry. A lack of interest from private sources for capital
investment may merely indicate that insufficient profit potential exists in the
latest semiconductor industry R&D. A firm will tend to invest in a given
R&D project if its estimated returns exceed the risks for the R&D required.
The private sector has demonstrated the ability to fund R&D projects if the
returns are sufficient. If the risks exceed the estimated returns, private firms
will tend not to invest. [Ref. 4:p. 16]
One justification for federal participation in commercial R&D would
be if the social rate of return exceeds the social risks. Social returns benefit the
public as a whole, such as highway systems, whereas private returns benefit
only those making the investment. If the private and social returns or
private and social risks diverge and the social returns are high enough to bear
the social risks, then federal government participation is justified. This
divergence between social and private R&D returns and risks is caused by
market imperfections. The first step in choosing areas to target with federal
incentives is to identify the relevant market imperfections. Then the
significance of the imperfections should be determined by comparing the
expected social costs and returns of R&D. Since the federal budget is limited,
alternate R&D projects should be compared against each other to determine
the optimum area for federal participation. [Ref. 4:p. 17]





• Indirect failures [Ref. 5:p. 3]
Appropriability imperfections arise when private firms are unable to
take advantage of the benefits resulting from their technology development
projects. It can be difficult for a firm to appropriate the benefits of its R&D if
imitation is easy or if the research results can be used by other firms in the
industry or other industries. In such cases, firms will under invest in R&D
because they incur all the costs, but only receive a portion of the benefits.
One reason frequently given to justify federal participation in basic
R&D is that the benefits of R&D are often particularly hard to appropriate. It
is also extremely difficult to appropriate external benefits, such as increases in
national security due to reductions in semiconductor imports, because market
prices do not fully reflect external benefits.
When technology is easily imitated, appropriability is frequently a
problem. The U.S. patent system was developed originally to maintain
appropriability. Today, however, U.S. and foreign researchers can engineer
very close to the originator's design without violating patent laws, while not
investing the full value for the information. Overseas enforcement of U.S.
patent laws is still very difficult. The lower cost of development for imitating
firms reduces the costs they must recoup relative to the original developers of
the product. This reduces the incentive to develop new technology. The
optimum degree of appropriability is hard to find, however, since perfect
appropriability would ensure a monopoly for the innovator. [Ref. 4:pp. 18-9]
The potential bias against capital intensive, high risk R&D projects
associated with private R&D funding decisions is referred to as uncertainty.
Uncertainties inherent to R&D, private industry's aversion to risk, and the
absence of R&D insurance, each contribute to this bias. Smaller R&D projects
and projects with multiple approaches are favored over projects which are
large and contain radically new products because this diversification tends to
reduce the effects of uncertainty.
Indivisibilities arise in larger projects where economies of scale exist.
Indivisibilities arise where it is impossible or prohibitively expensive to
divide a large R&D project into smaller tasks that can be funded by smaller
individual firms. With this imperfection, small firms are excluded from
larger capital investments like R&D for next generatio \ semiconductor chips.
Since R&D projects with economies of scale can only be supported by large
firms or a consortia of smaller firms, indivisibilities often limit private
investment. If there is an expectation of profit with a low enough risk as a
result of R&D, however, industry in the U.S. has displayed its ability to raise
the requisite venture capital. In cases like these, federal participation in
funding R&D should probably be used only in areas where private industry is
incapable of supporting the most suitable R&D approach.
Private market interventions and other federal policies that influence
private semiconductor industry R&D decisions indirectly, can result in
indirect failures. Indirect failures are often vague and complicated because of
the domino effect with economic failures. The semiconductor industry
exhibits many indirect failures which often have conflicting impacts. For
example, tax structures, antitrust policies, and patent laws are sources of
indirect failures. Indirect failures are relatively poorly defined and often have
neutralizing effects upon each other. [Ref. 6:p. 30]
When market imperfections justify federal intervention in R&D
beyond the basic stage, intervention must be used cautiously for two reasons.
First, it is difficult to determine the impact the numerous direct and indirect
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imperfections have on private R&D investment decisions. Second, since
market imperfections can be found in almost all industries and R&D projects,
and federal intervention involves appropriating scarce federal resources,
federal participation should be limited to those sectors which have the most
severe problems. Regardless of which sectors need the help the most,
justification for federal participation in a particular private sector R&D project
is indicated only if the expected social return is greater than the return from
competing R&D projects and from federal fund's alternative uses. [Ref. 4:pp.
22-4]
2. Appropriate Policies
Once justification for federal intervention is substantiated, the next
question to address is which federal intervention methods provide the
appropriate incentives at the lowest social cost? Costs of each incentive
method deemed appropriate should also be considered because of the
importance of prudently appropriating scarce federal funds.
Various federal policies which exist to stimulate industry R&D
include direct R&D funding, federal research grants or prizes, federal
procurement policies, input and output subsidies, tax incentives, patent
policy, and government performed R&D.
Traditionally, federal policy makers have favored direct control over
basic and public sector R&D. Unfortunately, direct funding of R&D only
attempts to treat the symptom of inadequate private sector funding, rather
than correcting the root problem caused by the market imperfection
involved. Furthermore, this tactic tends to be rather inefficient. Private
sector R&D is guided by competitive market forces. Federal policy makers,
however, tend to respond to political pressures. These responses,
consequently, may not be appropriate even if the correct market information
is received. [Ref. 6:p. 31]
It is unrealistic to think that a general micro policy for federal
intervention in commercial R&D would optimize all firms' investments,
because each firm's environment is quite different. Application of federal
incentives need to be considered on a case by case basis, while considering
such factors as the private market environment, market imperfections
present, and the potential side effects of the various interventions employed.
Federal funding of R&D projects tends to be effective where the public sector
is the consumer and the procurement policies associated with the products
alone are not effective at fostering R&D. As R&D projects move closer to
commercial application, private market forces increase in importance and
market failures increase in variety. Such is the case with the semiconductor
industry in the United States.
One mechanism that can be used to counter most market failures is
the use of grants and prizes to encourage research in specific areas where
research is not being done. Commercial and scientific integrity for this
technique are preserved by employing potential users and scientists when
awarding prizes and grants. This mechanism tends to avoid many of the
pitfalls associated with federal control of R&D. [Ref. 4:pp. 43-4]
The U.S. patent system, designed to prevent appropriability problems,
might be improved to encourage R&D in certain areas. The advantages of
this type of market intervention is that private market incentives are
preserved and the private sector maintains control of the process. However,
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drawbacks include the relative ease with which competitors imitate or invent
around patents, especially in the semiconductor industry, and the monopoly
power which is granted to an innovating firm if its patent is effective.
Federal procurement is one mechanism to employ when significant
market uncertainties exist or when external benefits are generated by early use
of technology which limit private R&D investment. At least initially, a
federally guaranteed market may provide enough incentive to stimulate
sufficient private R&D investment. Unfortunately, the federal government
does not represent a significant market for the U.S. semiconductor industry
today, as it did at the advent of the semiconductor. [Ref. 4:p. 45]
In cases where deviations exist between actual prices and socially
optimal prices which negatively affect R&D investment, input or output
subsidies are often recommended. Private industry will tend to undervalue
and hence, under invest in new technologies which generate significant
external benefits. In the commercial semiconductor industry, new technology
generates significant external benefits, such as increased military
technological superiority which contributes to enhanced national security.
The most popular input subsidy methods are accelerated
depreciation, tax credits, and loan guarantees. However, these mechanisms
all distort a firm's choice of capital and labor by subsidizing the cost of capital.
For example, loan guarantees encourage high debt ratios by transferring risk
to the federal government from the private sector, thus encouraging high
interest rates.
On the other hand, output subsidies, including price guarantees, are
not tied to factors of production and do not distort private market decisions.
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Output subsidies are preferred over input subsidies by most economists
because they correct deviations in actual prices while maintaining incentives
for private production and cost minimization. When market imperfections
call for subsidies as the method of intervention, input subsidies should only
be used when output subsidies are impractical or infeasible because of the
market advantages inherent to output subsidies. Input subsidies give federal
bureaucrats more influence over the private sector especially when the
industry is considered important. Furthermore, because input subsidies
obscure the costs to the government, they are preferred by both the public and
private sectors.
3. Summary
When choosing the appropriate policy to stimulate R&D in a
particular area, the stage of the R&D process, the market failures present, and
the industry's market environment should all be considered. [Ref. 4:pp. 47-9]
If federal intervention is to be used in a particular industry or sector,
the policies should be selected on a case by case basis. Particular attention
should be focused on the market failures, the R&D stage, the capacity for
centralized R&D control, the role of private market incentives, and the
environment of the associated industry's market. [Ref. 4:p. 51]
It would appear that the semiconductor industry in the U.S. is
affected to some degree by the market imperfections of appropriability and
uncertainty. First, the market place itself does not consider external public
benefits, such as increased military technological superiority, which
contribute to enhanced national security. Federal subsidies would appear to
be an appropriate intervention to address this appropriability imperfection
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and encourage private semiconductor firms to invest in advanced R&D
projects.
Second, the market imperfection of uncertainty which discourages
capital investment in the semiconductor industry could be addressed through
a federal procurement policy to reduce the uncertainties associated with
capital intensive R&D.
B. HISTORY OF THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
Initiating the development of the transistor and then the semiconductor,
the modern electronics industry began in the U.S. The semiconductor
industry thrived initially because innovative talent required for its success
was in abundant supply. Numerous startup companies with an
entrepreneurial spirit made tremendous strides in a very short time due to
inherent competition and the semiconductor's capacity for technological
innovation.
A major portion of the microchip market today is involved in the
manufacturing of dynamic random access memory (DRAM) chips. DRAMs
(pronounced dee-rams) are used for immediate data storage in every
computer. In 1975, U.S. companies controlled 90 percent of the world market
for DRAMs. In 1986, that share had shrunk to 5 percent as Japan, other Pacific
Rim countries, and even the Europeans took over the market. [Ref. 7: p. 471
Because the DRAM market accounted for only about 15% of the total
microchip market, the impact of this loss of market share was lessened.
Furthermore, this data only includes merchant DRAM producers (companies
producing DRAMs for sale on the open market). If captive producers (firms
producing DRAMs for internal consumption only), such as IBM and AT&T,
13
are included, the U.S. share of DRAM production would increase
significantly.
1. Strong Federal Support
Like the aircraft industry in its early days, the semiconductor industry
sold mostly to a government related market. It benefited from the support of
research sponsored by agencies ranging from the National Science
Foundation (NSF) to the Department of Defense (DCO). The industry also
enjoyed strong federal support given during the 1960s to advance scientific
and engineering education. [Ref. 8:p. 6] Today, only three percent of the U.S.
semiconductor industry's output is purchased by the DOD. This reduction of
market demand from the DOD has also reduced its leverage in affecting the
semiconductor market.
Most recently, the U.S. semiconductor industry has resorted to the
national security issue for protection against Japanese chip makers. This tact
has been successful because most policy makers agree that a strong domestic
semiconductor industry is necessary for U.S. national security interests. [Ref.
8:p. 6] These same policy makers, however, have been responsible for other
policies in the past which have had adverse results for the U.S. economy.
2. Semiconductor Pact of 1986 and SEMATECH
The electronics industry's importance for the U.S. economy has
allowed it to appeal to the government for help in dealing with foreign
competitors. This resulted in the 1986 semiconductor pact with Japan and the
establishment of the Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology
(SEMATECH) consortium in 1987. [Ref. 7:p. 47]
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In 1986, after being accused by the U.S. semiconductor industry of
dumping its DRAM chips (i.e., selling them for less than cost in foreign
markets or employing price discrimination between domestic and foreign
markets), Japan agreed to refrain from selling its chips to overseas markets for
less than the market price. Although the semiconductor industry received
exactly what it requested, the pact resulted in more advantages for the
Japanese. In the years immediately preceding the pact, Japanese chip makers
lost some $4 billion as they over expanded DRAM production and sold their
excess chips in the U.S. The pact required the Japanese to limit their DRAM
sales in the U.S., which raised the price of these chips significantly. After the
pact, Japanese manufacturers made huge profits and funded big R&D
programs designed to close the U.S. lead in state-of-the-art microchips and
design tools. By limiting imports, the U.S. actually encouraged the Japanese
to sell fewer semiconductor chips at higher profit margins, which resulted in
greater profits for the Japanese. Despite the protection provided by this pact,
U.S. producers failed to significantly increase DRAM output.
After the 1986 semiconductor pact failed to re-establish the U.S.
DRAM industry, the semiconductor industry appealed to the U.S.
government for further assistance. In 1987, the Department of Defense (DOD)
commissioned the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense
Semiconductor Dependency to address perceived semiconductor industry
problems which could potentially have a detrimental affect on the national
security of the United States. The board focused primarily on solving
potential national security problems caused by the apparent decline of the
semiconductor industry relative to overseas competition, specifically from
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Japan. [Ref. 9:p. 7] According to a Japanese publication, their
recommendations focused on "improving mass production capabilities—an
area that the U.S. has been deficient in and has tended to neglect." [Ref. 10:p.
1066] The main recommendation from the task force was to form a
government backed semiconductor manufacturing consortium called
Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology Institute or SEMATECH.
3. Differing Views
There are, however, other views which differ from those of the
outspoken semiconductor insiders. Some feel that the U.S. semiconductor
industry is not really as bad off as the industry spokespersons would like us to
believe. The U.S. global lead in computer hardware is shrinking slightly, but
remains relatively large. Total electronic systems production by U.S. firms in
1987 was some $143 billion, two-thirds larger than Japan's. Indications are
that the U.S. global share in hardware technologies has not fallen significantly
since 1982. This is a considerable accomplishment considering the ferocious
competition, especially in DRAM manufacturing. [Ref. ll:p. 81] Finally, in
the DRAM market, sales data exclude production by captive producers like
IBM and AT&T. This probably understates the U.S. share of the market by a
significant margin.
Is the U.S. semiconductor industry in dire straits? The answer given
generally depends on the viewpoint of the respondent. Typically, large,
established semiconductor firms present a pessimistic prognosis. For
example, the Defense Science Board Task Force concluded that the industry is
in deep trouble. But most members of the task force tended to represent
parochial interests of established semiconductor firms. Their consensus was
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that direct government involvement was necessary to save the
semiconductor industry. On the other hand, leaders of small innovative
semiconductor firms, which exploit new technologies, are more optimistic
about the industry's future and less likely to support government
intervention. One view holds that "the U.S. semiconductor industry has
historically responded to intense competition among domestic companies as
well as with Japanese and European firms—by a producing a continuous
stream of new devices, reducing production costs, and expanding
applications, creating new and larger markets." [Ref. 12:p. 13]
In the past few years, "small Silicon Valley Start-ups . . . have . . .
focused on producing limited numbers of sophisticated, custom-made chips.
The trend is toward smaller and smaller chips with more and more room to
store information on each one .... The value of chip design is increasing
exponentially." [Ref. 13:p. 10]
Those who advocate free trade for the industry make statements like,
"the 99 U.S. semiconductor startups launched over the last five years—from
Cypress to Actel—constitute the fastest-growing new generation of merchant
semiconductor firms in the history of the industry. So much for the U.S. chip
industry's needing protection." [Ref. ll:p. 82]
Those same proponents of free trade say that Japan's lead over the
United States is only in the production of the most basic kind of memory
chips, DRAMs. Although once thought to be critical to manufacturing
technologies, heavy production of DRAMs is not universally thought to be as
critical anymore. [Ref. 13:p.l0] There is much debate over that point,
however, as some believe that preeminence in the semiconductor industry
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must include preeminence in DRAM manufacturing technology. Others
believe that DRAM production has moved to the low-tech end of the
semiconductor industry while the U.S. remains the leader in high-tech,
innovative, customized microchips.
4. Alleged Causes of U.S. Decline
Proponents of government support cite at least three reasons for the
apparent decline of the U.S. semiconductor industry: advantages of the
Japanese approach, imitation, and the Japanese corporate structure.
The Japanese have taken a very different approach than that taken in
the U.S. in recent history. For example, the Japanese favor larger firms with a
more vertically integrated structure for its semiconductor industry, while U.S.
firms tend to be smaller and more specialized. This allegedly enables
Japanese firms to better afford to pursue R&D projects with longer lead times,
sometimes up to ten years. [Ref. 3:p. 31]
The predominantly vertically integrated internal structure of their
companies has favored Japan over the last decade. Japanese chip makers
design and fabricate massive quantities of chips for their affiliates to
incorporate in finished products as well as for export. (Of course, under
different circumstances, vertical integration can be a disadvantage.) Except for
IBM and AT&T, which are prohibited by anti-trust laws from entering the
merchant semiconductor market, "the U.S. industry is fragmented into high-
volume merchant companies that sell chips to other manufacturers, a few
Japanese-style vertically integrated companies (like NCR), semi-custom
manufacturers (like LSI Logic Corp. and VLSI Technology, Inc.), and design or
process specialists (like Brooktree Corp.)." [Ref. 7:p. 49]
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The cost of investment capital has also been lower in Japan, relative
to its cost in the U.S., during the early and mid 1980s. Because of this,
Japanese investors can accept a much lower and slower return on their capital
investment than can U.S. firms, who must achieve short-term profitability to
survive. [Ref. 7:p. 49]
While licensing of U.S. semiconductor products is practiced, a
significant amount of illegal imitation is also practiced, enabling imitators to
capture market share very inexpensively. For instance:
Imitators are a problem with the semiconductor industry since they
capture large parts or the bulk of the market. For evolutionary devices
like the first 64K DRAM, which incrementally improved upon 16K
DRAMs, the market share was lost by the innovator of a new device in
roughly two thirds of the cases. [Ref. 3:p. 31]
Because these reasons for the decline in the domestic semiconductor
industry, along with appeals to national security, are used to justify federal
intervention in the U.S., it is important to consider them carefully.
C FEDERAL PARTICIPATION IN BOLSTERING THE DEFENSE
INDUSTRIAL BASE
The success enjoyed by the industrial base of the U.S. has been due largely
to the fundamental characteristics of the economic system, rather than
through the participation of the federal government. Rather than promoting
the health of American industry, the federal government historically has
focused on protecting consumers against business excesses. U.S. industrial
success occurred, despite the federal government's involvement, because the
economic system in place provided the means for creating wealth through
the freedom to reap profits from hard work and innovation, allowing the
U.S. to become the leader in world output and technology. In the past, U.S.
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industry has not needed government support to flourish, although the
federal government did play a vital role in funding R&D for numerous
government and defense related projects.
In the 1950s and 1960s, American industry dominated world
manufacturing. American manufacturers could focus on quantity to the
neglect of quality. American manufacturers were complacent, while
other countries began building powerful new industrial infrastructures
and developing superior process technology to manufacture easily-
obtained American product designs and technology. [ ^ef. 14:pp. 14-5]
The lack of a focal point in the federal government to consider the impact
of potentially conflicting policies relating to the "industrial base often causes
inadvertent but harmful results." [Ref. 14:p. 16] In recent years, certain federal
government policies designed to aid an industry, such as the Semiconductor
Pact of 1986 with Japan, have actually reduced the overall competitiveness of
the U.S. industrial base because of conflicting effects on industries related to
and dependent on semiconductors.
Some people perceive that import barriers erected by foreign
governments have created an unlevel playing field that favors foreign
business. However, in recent years, U.S. domestic policies and practices have
also contributed to that perception. The growing national deficit contributes
to the high cost of capital in the U.S. Tax laws which reward personal credit
and discourage personal savings all contribute to a higher cost of capital in the
U.S. Examples include: home mortgage deductions, double taxation of
interest and dividend income, reduction of tax benefits for individual
retirement accounts (IRAs), and unfavorable capital gains taxes.
Intrusions into the market by the legislative and the executive branches
of the U.S. government, including the tax code, anti-trust laws, and DOD
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acquisition policies often discourage capital investment in domestic industry.
While these restrictive laws may have been appropriate and effective in years
past, some changes may need to occur to reflect significant foreign
competition. [Ref. 14:p. 16]
Historically, the semiconductor industry in the U.S. has had a strong
interest in military and space applications. While most of the early work that
laid the foundations for the semiconductor industry was privately financed, a
governmental market, rather than a private market, made it profitable for
firms such as Texas Instruments and IBM to invest in semiconductor and
computer R&D. [Ref. 8:p. 456] Advanced education and university-based
research relevant to these industries have continued to receive public
financial support. [Ref. 8:p. 452] DOD, who was once the largest
semiconductor consumer, now accounts for a very small portion of the
semiconductor market by volume or by sales revenue. [Ref. 7:p. 48]
Under DOD, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
"has had an impact on the nation's technology development well out of
proportion to its size. With projects like high-definition television and
SEMATECH, DARPA is being propelled, only partly by its own choosing, into
the role of venture capitalist for America's high-technology industry." [Ref.
16:p. l,sec. 3]
As a result of perceived microchip dumping, the semiconductor industry
sought and obtained governmental action in the form of anti-dumping
sanctions against Japanese chip makers in 1986. The effects of this anti-
dumping campaign turned out to be disastrous for most U.S. consumers of
DRAM microchips. Spot shortages and increased prices made a significant
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detrimental impact on many U.S. domestic consumers (e.g., the computer
industry) who had come to rely on an inexpensive and sufficient source of
DRAMs.
In 1987, the U.S. government began financial support of SEMATECH to
expand the research and development (R&D) of advanced manufacturing
techniques. The objective is to catch the Japanese who have surpassed the
U.S. in terms of DRAM manufacturing capabilities.
The most recent government attempts to support the DRAM industry
may be counterproductive. Considering the domination the Japanese have
achieved in the DRAM market, and the results of the 1986 Semiconductor
pact, there is reason to question further efforts to protect this industry in the
U.S.
One positive feature of the government's commitment to SEMATECH is
that its continued funding depends on an annual affirmation by the President
to ensure the government/industry consortium is succeeding in its goal to
improve DRAM manufacturing competitiveness. This policy will help
minimize the government's losses, if SEMATECH does not succeed.
Historically, the federal government has been slow to kill ongoing projects in
the face of pessimistic prognoses (i.e., SST, nuclear breeder reactor). [Ref. 7:p.
50]
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m. NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
In this chapter, the views of those who favor actions to protect and
promote the U.S. semiconductor industry in the interest of national security
are stated predominantly. This reflects the fact that federal policy makers
appear to have adopted this position. The views of those who favor more
free market economics are included at the conclusion of this chapter.
A. WHAT IS NATIONAL SECURITY?
The concept of national security has taken on an overwhelmingly
military flavor since World War II. The military threat to national security,
however, is only one of many which include political, economic, social, and
environmental threats. [Ref. 17:pp. 21-3] Military power is useless against
these new threats. Nonmilitary threats to a nation's security are not as clearly
defined as military ones. According to Lester Brown, the goal of national
security policy should be to maximize national security rather than to just
maximize military power. [Ref. 17:p. 22]
To some, the shrinking of America's share of world production is
alarming because of its implications for American grand strategy, measured
not by military forces alone, but by their integration with all those other
elements which contribute toward a successful long-term policy. [Ref. 18:p. 29]
In 1965, Berkowitz and Bock defined national security by stating, "[it] can
be most fruitfully defined as the ability of a nation to protect its internal
values from external threats." [Ref. 19:p. x] In 1968, Robert McNamara
discussed the trend to militarize the term when he wrote that "we have been
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lost in a semantic jungle for too long and have come to identify security with
exclusively military phenomena and most particularly with military
hardware. It just isn't so." [Ref. 20:p. 150] Writing in American Defense
Policy, Reichart and Sturm state:
Security concerns not only the protection of "values previously
acquired," but also expectations about the future and the value outcomes
to be experienced at a later time. Thus, security concerns not only the
avoidance of loss, but also the prevention of blocked gain. . . .
Security can now be defined more formally as the expectation of
retaining and enhancing the ability to partake of highly regarded value
outcomes free of obstructions. National security thus becomes security
with respect to 'value outcomes' desired by those who comprise the
effective political base of a nation. [Ref. 21 :p. 19]
National security cannot be maintained unless national economies
can be sustained, but, unfortunately, the health of many economies
cannot be sustained for much longer without major adjustments.
National security requires a stable economy with assured supplies of
materials for industry. In this sense, frugality and conservation of
materials are essential to our national security. Security means more
than safety from hostile attack; it includes the preservation of a system of
civilization. [Ref. 21:pp. 22-4]
Thus, national security involves military and economic issues. Many feel
that maintaining a domestic production capability for the most advanced
semiconductor products is necessary, from both a military and economic view
point, for the U.S. to maintain its national security. There is an opportunity
cost associated with that domestic capability, however, because the cost of
R&D required for advanced electronics is high. If the U.S. would import its
semiconductor supplies, rather than producing its own, the costs would most
certainly be reduced, at least for the short term. These resources could be used
for other military or domestic purposes. Thus, national security concerns
should be considered carefully.
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B. THE MILITARY THREAT
Amidst these times of radical change in world politics, the most
significant military threat to U.S. national security continues to come from
the Soviet Union. The Soviets continue to build their arsenal of nuclear and
conventional weapons despite major concessions to numerous political
groups inside and outside the Soviet Union. They have attained an
undisputed numerical superiority of weapons systems over all of their
potential adversaries, including the U.S. Historically, the Soviets' arsenal was
built with technology significantly inferior to that of the U.S. and of the West.
Since the Soviet's began their military buildup, and especially since the
Soviets surpassed the United States in weapons quantity, the U.S. strategy of
employing technologically superior weapons systems has attempted to
counter the numerically superior Soviet forces. In recent years, the Soviets
have also recognized that:
Progress in many key areas of warfighting capability will require
advanced microelectronic and computer technology. Consequently, the
Soviets have made acquiring this technology a high priority. As the US
lead in semiconductor technology is reduced by formidable competition
from Japan, the Soviets are increasing their technology acquisition
efforts in Japanese laboratories and industries. [Ref. 22:p. 135]
As the Soviets seek to close the technology gap with the West,
"sophisticated defense systems produced by advanced technology sectors of a
nation's industrial base will prove even more important to Western defense
in the future." [Ref. 22:p. 139]
The new argument runs like this: Leadership in semiconductor
technology is a "force multiplier." That is, high-technology U.S.
weapons offset whatever quantitative advantages the Soviets possess.
Semiconductor applications enhance U.S. military capabilities
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particularly in early warning, air-defense, and air-to-surface-attack
systems; conventional artillery and tanks; and naval surface warfare.
[Ref. 7:p. 47]
In addition to enhancing the performance of various weapons systems,
semiconductor chips are also used to increase their efficiency through
sophisticated intelligence and command and control systems.
Increasingly over the past years, the U.S. has come to rely on this force
multiplier when developing and purchasing new ard improved weapons
systems. Because the U.S. is placing so much of its reliance on superior
technology in semiconductor and electronics applications for its defense
posture, many feel that it is extremely important that the U.S. maintain its
leading edge technology. [Ref. 9:p. 17] If that edge is lost and made available to
U.S. adversaries, specifically to the Soviet Union, the balance of military
power would shift totally in the Soviets' favor, since they would then have
the quantitative as well as the qualitative advantage. Closely tied with the
fate of the U.S. in this situation is that of the nations of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) whose forces similarly rely on a technological
advantage. This advantage is ultimately traceable to semiconductors. [Ref.
15:p. 6] Thus, national security requires the ability to exploit new
semiconductor technology for military purpose.
A related national security issue concerns potential cutoffs from foreign
suppliers. For example, some hold the position that "our national defense is
not dependent now upon foreign manufacturers and must not become
dependent in the future." [Ref. 9:p. 21] They warn that "the chief economic
danger in a limited war is one . . . [where] ... a cutoff in vital materials [is]
supplied by enemy-sympathizing foreign powers on which we had become
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dependent." [Ref. 23:p. 150] For instance, if the U.S. were to become almost
totally dependent on Japan for its supply of chips for weapons systems, and if
its supply were interrupted due to Japan restricting access or making these
chips available to the Soviet Union, the balance of power could change
drastically. [Ref. 15:p. 14] The bottom line here is that the U.S. would not
have another country to really depend on to insure that it had continued
access to the most advanced technology in semiconductors available. [Ref. 9:p.
22]
The recent trend, however, indicates a shifting of DRAM manufacturing
technology and production to other Pacific Rim nations such as South Korea,
Taiwan, Singapore, etc. Furthermore, Japan is dependent on the U.S., maybe
even to a greater degree than the U.S. depends on Japan. This reduces Japan's
ability to cut off supplies of critical defense products.
DOD needs then to maintain a secure supply of sophisticated electronics
and the capability to design new systems that exploit these technologies.
Some analysts believe that this requires a domestic semiconductor industry to
continue to supply state-of-the-art electronics for its weapons systems. [Ref.
3:p. 29]
For example, in February 1987, the Defense Science Board Task Force on
Semiconductor Dependency concluded that:
U.S. military forces depend heavily on technological superiority to win.
Electronics is the technology that can be most highly leveraged.
Semiconductors are the key to leadership in electronics.
Competitive, high-volume production is the key to leadership in
semiconductors.
High-volume production is only supported by the commercial market.
[Ref. 24:p. 94]
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While a domestic production capability for advanced semiconductor
manufacturing is the direction the Defense Science Board recommended, it is
an option with very high costs. Since, the Japanese have a solid lead in the
production of DRAMs, the costs involved with re-acquiring the lead in
DRAM production may be prohibitive, or the money more effectively
invested elsewhere, and offer very small rewards over other alternatives such
as diversified foreign supply.
The decision to protect the domestic semiconductor industry on the basis
of national security should be based on the costs and benefits of this proposal.
The benefit is determined by the severity of the national security threat. This
depends on both the extent of our foreign dependence on semiconductors and
the possibility of a supply cutoff, as determined by the nature and duration of
potential future conflicts.
1. Dependence on Foreign Suppliers of Semiconductors
The United States today is dependent on Japan for a significant
number of components used in several critical weapons systems which
would be essential for prosecuting any prolonged conflict. [Ref. 22:p. 138]
According to Dr. Kerber, testifying before the 1987 DSB Task Force on Defense
Semiconductor Dependency,
... a number of systems were found to contain semiconductors available
only from foreign-owned, foreign-located, sources. GPS, IUS, DCSC,
DSP, DMSP, FLTSATCOM, ASAT, ASN-10, F-16, AIM-7, SSQ AN-53B,
AN/APG-63, HP, Ml Tank, AHIP, AN/ARC-182, AN/PRC-119,
AN/ASN-92, AN/AYK-14, AM-6988 A POET, F-18. Many domestic
semiconductors used in military systems are packaged and tested in
foreign countries and ceramic packages are available almost exclusively
from Japan. [Ref. 9:pp.21-2]
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While Dr. Kerber testified about the number of weapons systems
which have components produced in foreign countries, National Defense
University studies reveal that "U.S. dependence on foreign suppliers varies
greatly from one weapon system to the next, making generalizations
difficult." [Ref. 25:p. 9] In fact, until recently, DOD was not keeping accurate
records on the place of manufacture of components used in its weapons
systems.
The DSB task force concluded in 1987 that although U.S. dependency
is modest today, trends in semiconductor manufacturing indicate that the
U.S. will become increasingly dependent on foreign sources if preventative
actions are not taken. [Ref. 9:p. 5] Under current trends, the task force
expected the U.S. to reach a dangerous level of foreign dependence in about
five years. [Ref. 9:p. 21]
To most within the DOD and the federal government, "the concept of
'dependence' on overseas suppliers for critical military inputs [is] foreign
indeed." [Ref. 25:p. 100] The U.S. has no past experience with being dependent
on foreign technology which is critical to its defense. The market power of a
single foreign source supplying critical items could be enormous and might
result in higher defense systems cost if only one firm supplied the items or if
the country formed a cartel to fix export prices. The implications for transfer
of classified information or the potential for non-acceptance of classified
material is also very disconcerting. [Ref. 9:p. 20]
The semiconductor industry is not comprised only of DRAMs,
however. Today, America's primary strength is in innovation.
Microprocessors, the second largest selling chips, are much more profitable
29
than DRAMs. Their market is dominated by the American firms of Intel and
Motorola as much as the Japanese dominate DRAMs. Many, however,
maintain that DRAMs are a 'technology driver' and their domestic supply is
vital to a flourishing electronics industry in the future. [Ref. 26:p. 66]
Even for DRAMs, IBM is the largest producer, but because it
consumes all it produces, its output is not included in market-share figures.
[Ref. 27:p. 16] Because firms such as IBM and AT&T consume all the
semiconductors they produce, they are termed captive producers.
Comparisons of DRAM producers only consider merchant producers, those
who sell their semiconductor chips on the open market. If IBM and AT&T
could supply the U.S. with the right type of advanced semiconductor chips in
the event of a military crisis, foreign dependence might not be such a risky
proposition.
Why is it really that bad to become dependent on foreign firms? The
alternative to maintaining a secure domestic semiconductor industry is to use
devices manufactured by foreign firms or manufactured in the U.S. under
foreign license. This option, however, may reduce the flexibility of U.S.
foreign policy or compromise the advantage in U.S. military technology. [Ref.
3:p. xvii] Of course, foreign countries such as Japan may be unwilling or
unable to restrict exports to the U.S. because of their dependence on the U.S.
As the potential for cost savings increases with multiple foreign
sources of defense system components, brought on by increased
'globalization' of manufacturing technologies in semiconductors, as well as
many other products, the trade off with the associated security risk must be
considered very carefully. [Ref. 25:p. 105]
30
2. How Long Will the Next War Last?
At the conclusion of World War II, only the United States possessed
an atomic capability. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union developed atomic
power. For the next few years, as additional R&D yielded weapons with
greater and greater destructive power, the U.S. and the Soviet Union began a
standoff policy of deterrence. Many felt that conventional warfare had come
to a close forever. The years since then have proven those theorists wrong as
literally hundreds of conventional battles and wars have been fought with no
escalation to a nuclear exchange. According to a 1960 RAND Corporation
study entitled, "The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age," extensive
economic planning for an extended war has become irrelevant now that we
have entered the nuclear age. The authors argued that preparation for a
sustained conventional war should take the lowest priority for U.S.
preparations because of its unlikeliness. [Ref. 28:pp. 13-4] Throughout the
years since the nuclear age began, the U.S. has come to depend upon the
nuclear umbrella for protection. Conventional warfare equipment has taken
second place to strategic nuclear weapons. In the past few years, numerous
authors have written that a nuclear war is becoming less and less of a threat,
but that conventional warfare has replaced it as a means of power projection.
Although the U.S. has the recognized technological superiority, the size of its
conventional arsenal casts doubts toward its ability to wage an extended,
conventional war with the Soviets.
Although the U.S. has recommited itself to conventional deterrence,
it continues to develop only limited numbers of expensive high-tech
weapons. A paradox exists because conventional wars are historically wars of
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attrition. If the U.S. were to become involved in a conventional war, despite
its sophisticated weapons, it would still only be able to sustain war for a
limited time. [Ref. 25:p. 1041
Some ask if the U.S. industrial base were to continue to shrink and a
large scale conventional war developed, could American production capacity
still support a war of attrition? Others ask if the potential adversaries of the
U.S. in a large scale conventional war could supp >rt a war of attrition
themselves?
Some suggest that if the U.S. were to become involved in a coalition
war where foreign supplies of semiconductors were no longer available and
its domestic capabilities had declined, the most critical constraint placed upon
any necessary wartime production surge might be the number of skilled
craftsmen left in the U.S. [Ref. 18:p. 32] Today, due to the complexity of the
most advanced microchips, most production is accomplished by machines
and robot devices. Engineering expertise would still be required to design and
build high-tech production equipment.
Would it be necessary to maintain a production capability for
semiconductors if we expected a nuclear war? The U.S. capacity for long term
military production would probably count for very little when compared to
its capacity for first strike and retaliation if a nuclear war began.
In a conventional war, would a submarine campaign be a major
factor in disrupting U.S. sea lines of communication and international trade
conducted on the high seas? In a limited war, such as the conflicts in Korea
or Vietnam, is there much probably of a Soviet submarine campaign directed
towards international trade among U.S. trading partners? If not, why should
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the U.S. protect its semiconductor industry at all? Could the U.S. continue to
import its supplies from throughout the world? These questions are not easy
to answer, in fact, they are impossible to answer short of knowing the future.
The U.S. then, would be wise to choose either a worst case or a most probable
scenario and base decisions on the corresponding expected costs and benefits.
[Ref. 23:pp. 149-50]
C THE ECONOMIC THREAT
Some feel that in order to continue to produce the technology to meet the
needs of an increasingly more sophisticated military, the U.S. will need to
maintain a healthy, internationally competitive semiconductor and
electronics industry and safeguard its technological superiority. If the U.S.
cannot compete successfully, its world markets would shrink, causing an
erosion of the industrial base which has become so heavily dependent upon
electronics. They warn that if no short term policies are enacted to minimize
a relative decline in the U.S. semiconductor market for DRAMs, the U.S.
could become increasingly dependent upon foreign technologies for its
defense, while its economy weakens. [Ref. 22:p. 139]
Economic strength goes hand in hand with military strength. As
Schlesinger argued, "the efficient use of economic capabilities could provide
the critical margin needed for victory." [Ref. 25:p. 100]
One perception widely held by our major competitors is that leadership in
the semiconductor industry can result in leadership in many industries. [Ref.
15:p. 7] Conversely, many believe the U.S. may experience a loss of its
leadership in the semiconductor industry, possibly resulting in a loss of
leadership in many industries. The cost of losing the technology edge to
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foreign companies would certainly be high in many respects, "but to lose out
in the competition in future technologies, if that indeed should occur, would
be even more disastrous." [Ref. 18:p. 29]
If the U.S. is to regain the technological lead which many believe has
already largely been lost to foreign competitors, proponents of federal
intervention maintain that it must act quickly and decisively. Some feel that
"because technological knowledge is cumulative, once technological
leadership is lost, it is very difficult to regain. The United States, therefore,
has an ever-shortening window of opportunity in which to regain
technological leadership before it finds itself behind the state-of-the-art." [Ref.
15:p. 10] Others, however, recognize that it was possible for nations such as
Japan to make amazing strides forward even when the U.S. was the leader in
technology and production techniques.
The Japanese position in the semiconductor industry today did not come
without a cost. For the first few years, they lost some $4 billion as they
targeted a high volume manufacturing capability for DRAMs, but over
expanded their capacity. Today, due to a U.S.-Japan trade agreement which
effectively increased their market power, Japanese manufacturers are making
huge profits which frees more capital investment in R&D aimed at closing
the U.S. lead in state-of-the-art semiconductor technology. The chip
agreement has enabled the Japanese to become "much more formidable long-
term competitors." [Ref. ll:p. 81]
Finally, it is important to note that much of the thrust behind the current
call for government involvement in the semiconductor industry has relied
upon the national security issue. However, DOD has very little leverage with
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the commercial semiconductor industry, because only three percent of the its
output quantity is acquired by the military. [Ref. 9:p. 6] Thus, spill overs from
defense programs to the general economy are likely to be somewhat limited,
particularly with regard to DRAM production.
D. DO CONDITIONS IN THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY POSE A
NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT?
Earlier in this chapter, the positions of those who believe in the necessity
to maintain a domestic production capability for semiconductors in case of
war was discussed. There are others who seriously question the rationale for
that conclusion. They recognize that although the U.S. has lost the lead in
DRAM manufacturing technology and is continuing to lose market share in
other areas as well, such as microprocessors and EPROMs, innovation is still
strong in the U.S. They question whether the cost of R&D to maintain the
technological lead is worth the expense since imitation through reverse
engineering is so much less expensive than performing leading edge R&D.
1. Military Threat
What weapons rely on semiconductors? Today, virtually all weapons
and weapons support systems, except the most simple, somehow incorporate
semiconductors. Earlier in this chapter, a number of weapons systems were
listed which depend entirely on semiconductors produced outside of the U.S.
As weapons technology becomes more sophisticated, the use of advanced
semiconductors becomes more and more common. Weapons that now
depend on semiconductors range from strategic nuclear deterrence weapons
to tactical communications systems.
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If strategic nuclear weapons are ever used, there would seem to be no
further need for resupply of damaged semiconductors because of the expected
severity of damage. In a conventional conflict, however, resupply of vital
communications equipment would be essential to ensure proper command
and control for weapons systems employed. Especially in low intensity
conflicts around the world, semiconductor resupply would be critical to
sustaining the fight leading to a victorious conclusion.
What scenarios are most likely? It would appear that in light of
recent world events involving the apparent decline of communism that large
scale war is not very likely. Low intensity conflicts, civil unrest, and wars of
proxy are the most likely scenarios for which the U.S. must plan. In that type
of conflict, if the U.S. became dependent on foreign supply of semiconductor
chips, the chance of a cutoff of those supplies would be small. Another
possibility exists, however, where the foreign supplier may decide to cut off
U.S. semiconductor supply if they disagreed with U.S. foreign policy. Of
course, this threat is diminished to the extent that foreign dependence on the
U.S. limits their ability to cut off supplies. Furthermore, IBM , AT&T, and
other captive U.S. producers could provide the necessary semiconductor chips
during a national security emergency.
If the U.S. captive industry is insufficient or inappropriate, another
possible solution to this potential problem might be to maintain a diversified
portfolio of foreign suppliers to provide insurance against having all
semiconductor supplies cutoff. Instead of depending on only Japan for its
semiconductor needs, the U.S. may opt to contract with other Pacific Rim
nations and European nations to provide semiconductor chips. Similarly, a
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strategy of encouraging foreign owned corporations to produce
semiconductors in the U.S. could be effective. Another option might be to
encourage U.S. firms to engage in joint ventures with foreign firms in order
to share advanced technologies and benefit both nations concerned.
These options would enable the U.S. to be virtually assured of
required semiconductors supplies in case of war and take advantage of lower
costs from foreign suppliers. Furthermore, these options would eliminate
the requirement to pour billions of dollars into R&D for semiconductor
manufacturing technology, where Japan already has the world lead, and use
the money instead to satisfy other defense or civilian needs.
2. Economic Threat
Because national security includes military and electronics
dimensions, it is important to consider how critical DRAMs are to the
electronics industry and to the U.S. economy. Those who promote a domestic
DRAM capability argue that DRAMs are technology drivers. In other words,
advanced capabilities in DRAM technology allow other semiconductor
technologies to advance. There are others that argue that DRAM
manufacturing technology is at the low end of the technology spectrum and
despite the exodus of mass DRAM manufacturing capabilities offshore, the U.
S. still enjoys the lead at the high end of the spectrum in innovative and
custom use semiconductor chips.
Do we need to maintain the lead in basic areas to maintain the lead in
advanced areas? The DRAM market industry lead has shifted from the U.S.
to Japan over past few years, but the U.S. continues to be the technology
leader through numerous small semiconductor companies that thrive on
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innovation and customized microchips. While the future may bring about a
shift in this situation, no decline in the U.S. technology lead has yet been
observed.
Why does technological superiority have to come from the U.S.? For
many years, the U.S. has been the technology leader in electronics and most
recently in semiconductors. Despite this fact, the Japanese have achieved
remarkable success by importing U.S. technology, imp oving upon it, adding
various enhancements to consumer products, and selling them back to the
U.S. consumer at very competitive prices. The main reason for this situation
is that R&D costs are very high and increasing for each successive generation
of innovation. For the past 20 to 30 years, the U.S. has paid the R&D price,
while the Japanese and others have been patient to wait and imitate U.S.
innovation. The lower cost of capital in Japan has also enable Japanese
companies charge lower prices for their semiconductor products.
In order to maintain U.S. national security, the U.S. then must have
access to advanced technology, but not necessarily sole possession of that
technology. Since the Soviet Union has such overwhelming numerical
superiority in military forces, however, they must be denied the most
advanced technologies available in order for the U.S. to maintain a military
balance vis a vis the Soviet Union.
Conflicting opinions make a definite conclusion of whether or not
national security is significant justification for federal intervention
impossible. For the sake of argument, however, the next chapter of this thesis
will adopt the premise that the national security issue requires a domestic
source of semiconductors to provide a stable supply of chips in wartime and
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to maintain the U.S. technology lead. Given that federal policy makers
appear to have accepted this premise, the following chapter will examine
alternative policies to ensure a domestic source of semiconductors. Given
that a domestic production capability is not necessary to maintain U.S.
national security, an alternate approach will be addressed in the final chapter.
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IV. FUTURE OPTIONS FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
Because U.S. national security depends on both an adequate supply of
semiconductor chips, both for now and for the future, and on the capability to
design advanced semiconductor products for use in superior weapons
systems, many assume that a domestic semiconductor manufacturing
capability and R&D sufficient to stay in the technological lead are necessary.
Unfortunately, the external benefit of national security derived from leading
edge technology is not considered by private sector firms interested in profit
maximization. This market failure can be categorized as an appropriability
imperfection.
There are several reasons for the U.S. semiconductor industry's alleged
decline relative to Japan. Today's ?xtremely high cost of R&D means that
larger and larger amounts of capital are necessary to finance each new
generation of semiconductor chips. The Japanese currently have an
advantage in this area because interest rates in Japan have been lower than
interest rates in the U.S. In the late! 980s, however, interest rates have been
getting closer and closer as capital markets have become more international.
More liberal anti-trust laws and government encouragement have
allowed Japanese semiconductor firms to become much more vertically
integrated than their U.S. counterparts. This industry structure allows
Japanese firms to more readily take advantage of economies of scale, cross-
subsidize certain products within their corporations, and absorb short term
fluctuations in production levels. During the infancy of the semiconductor
40
industry in Japan, the Japanese government granted subsidies to stimulate
production and to protect its new domestic industries.
For these reasons, among others, the Japanese semiconductor industry
today enjoys a competitive advantage over the U.S. semiconductor industry.
As more and more of the world semiconductor market shifts to the Japanese,
additional profits are being reinvested in R&D projects to ensure their future
growth.
Advantages for Japanese business are not limited to just the
semiconductor industry or to the electronics industry. Although the
semiconductor and electronics industries are very important to both the U.S.
and Japan, they still comprise only part of their respective economies.
Merchant semiconductor manufacturers in the U.S. have been accused of
prematurely resorting to the national security justification for increased
government support for their struggling businesses. If the real problem for
the semiconductor industry is indirect failures of the U.S. economy caused by
macro factors such as the higher interest rates and more stringent anti-trust
laws in the U.S., then federal intervention on a micro level would not be
justified.
Most economists would agree that free international trade is the best
option for the world economy as a whole, because of its inherent efficiency.
Individual groups may lose, however, if free trade is practiced since free
international trade favors no particular individual groups. Protectionist
policies tend to favor specific industries, but hurt the overall economy. As
more obstacles to free trade are instituted, a nation's economy becomes less
and less efficient. Although the overall economy loses, the government of
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that nation may gain from income derived from tariffs and customs duties
when protectionist policies are instituted. [Ref. 29:p. 6]
Scarce federal dollars for appropriation to various governmental
programs is an increasingly important political issue. Are the public benefits
which may be derived from federal spending in the semiconductor industry
worth the resulting increase in the federal deficit? Many believe the answer
is yes. Some argue that the national security benefits coupled with the
economic benefits that would be reaped from the success of the U.S.
semiconductor industry in related industries would be well worth the cost
and even vital to the survival of the U.S. economy. [Ref. 3:p. 37] Others argue
that federal government action to encourage R&D is necessary for the U.S.
semiconductor industry because "the market, left to its own devices, will not
invest in the 'right' amount of R&D and will not make these investments in
the 'right' places." [Ref. 3:p. 30]
On the other hand, some analysts believe that national security benefit it
is small and that economic benefits should encourage private investment in
R&D. Furthermore, the federal government is not effective at identifying the
"right" amount of R&D and the "right" places. Therefore, federal
intervention is not justified according to this view point.
Assuming that federal intervention is justified on a national security
basis, a number of options available for the federal government will be
discussed in the following sections. These options include a hands off policy,
tariffs, strategic stockpiling, Buy American regulations, DOD production, anti-
dumping measures, subsidies, and industry consortia.
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A. HANDS OFF POLICY
As discussed earlier, the free trade which would result from a hands off
policy by all trading nations, would be the most efficient policy and bring the
most benefit to world trade as a whole. However, this may not be the best
solution for each individual trading nation or each industry in that nation.
One reason to support a hands off policy for the U.S. federal government
might be the historical lack of past success of federal interventions. As in the
case of anti-dumping measures taken in 1985, which lead to the U.S.-Japan
Semiconductor Pact of 1986, the U.S. government's solution was actually
counterproductive and probably resulted in more damage than protection for
the semiconductor and electronics industries.
The Bush Administration has not taken any specific action to encourage
improvements in the semiconductor industry because of its desire not to
single out any particular industry for support which may result in negative
fallout for other industries. Their lack of action policy thus far has effectively
been a hands off policy. This hands off policy has resulted in a number of
U.S. semiconductor firms negotiating joint ventures with foreign firms to
share advanced semiconductor technology, especially in DRAM
manufacturing. Texas Instruments has teamed with Hitachi, Intel with
NMB, and IBM with Siemens. Perhaps this trend is only a means for
survival. There has also been a number of industry consortia formed to offset
rising R&D costs for future semiconductor technolog.es. Some have had
limited success, while one, US Memories, recently gave up before it even
started, due to lack of financial support from its potential members.
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Some feel that "the market for semiconductor chips is working well, if
only politicians will leave it alone." [Ref. 27:p. 17] They feel the Department
of Defense should also leave the industry alone as, "already the Defense
Department's export restrictions, designed to keep high technology out of the
Soviets' hands, allow Japanese firms to capture foreign markets that
otherwise would be American." [Ref. 13:p. 11]
A hands off policy would definitely be the or tion with the lowest
appropriations cost, but the results could potentially be very costly to the
nation as a whole if it failed to protect national security.
There are a number of shortfalls associated with joint cooperative
ventures with foreign firms. First, to the extent production of semiconductor
products in these cooperative ventures is concentrated overseas, they do very
little to guarantee a secure supply of semiconductors for the U.S. Second, it is
important to consider the type of technology that is transferred in each
direction, to determine the potential impact on national security. Similarly,
patent and licensing agreements are difficult to enforce with foreign firms
which sometimes leads to the escape of vital high technology secrets such as
with Toshiba selling computer products to the Soviets. Finally, the potential
exists for a nation such as Japan to deny the exportation of advanced
technology products if they are to be used ultimately in weapons systems.
If a hands off policy were to be adopted by the U.S., a short term fallback
position to ensure an adequate supply of advanced semiconductor products in
a crisis situation might be to depend on captive semiconductor producers
such as IBM and AT&T which consume all the chips they produce.
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B. TARIFFS
Tariffs are duties imposed on imported goods. If a nation's government
wishes to protect a new industry from foreign competition, a simple tariff
might seem reasonable. Tariffs tend to create an adversarial relationship
between trading nations and encourage retaliatory behavior. Prior to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the use of tariffs was excessive. In
recent years, this volatile political method has been avoided for the most part
through international agreements. Various other means of protectionism
have been used which do not envoke the same emotion and tendency toward
global tariff wars. [Ref. 30:p. 14] A number of these non-tariff methods will be
discussed later in this chapter.
The use of tariffs also tends to address the symptoms of a problem, rather
than the causes of a problem. In the semiconductor industry, the national
security problem is the lack of domestic production capability. The cause of
the problem is high interest rates and excessive anti-trust regulation. Tariffs
are not likely to be successful in the long run because they address the
symptoms, not the causes of the problem. Today, tariffs, as a means to protect
domestic industries, are very much discouraged. [Ref. 30:p. 22]
While tariffs may appear to be a simple solution for certain market
imperfections, politicians who support them "fail to address the charge that
whenever industry and agriculture are protected, they become less




The effects of anti-dumping measures are very similar to those of tariffs.
Anti-dumping measures address only the symptoms of a market failure,
create forces for retaliatory actions by opposing nations, and historically have
not been effective in solving trade problems.
For several reasons already discussed, Japanese semiconductor
manufacturers have been able to sell their products at lower prices than can
U.S. manufacturers. In the past, U.S. semiconductor firms have accused the
Japanese of dumping their DRAM chips on the U.S. market.
According to Article VII of GATT, dumping is defined as the sale of a
product abroad at a lower price than is charged domestically. If that price
difference is judged to cause material injury to an established domestic
industry, that country may impose an antidumping duty to bring the
price in the domestic market up to the price in the market of the
exporting country. [Ref. 29:p. 70]
However, some argue that Article VII of GATT "overly favor[s] domestic
producers at the expense of domestic consumers." They argue that the lower
prices charged in a foreign market may merely reflect a rational for profit
maximization through international price discrimination, rather than
predatory dumping. They say that predatory dumping in the U.S. is much
less of a problem than semiconductor industry spokesmen allege and merely
a convenient excuse for further government protection. [Ref. 29:p. 70]
Despite doubts about the intent of alleged dumping, past anti-dumping
measures have produced questionable results. "For example, import quotas
for DRAMs, negotiated with the Japanese in 1986, had significant adverse
effects on the computer and electronics industries, but did not seem to help
the U.S. DRAM industry." [Ref. 31:p. 552] Some feel that the fallout from this
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agreement caused "a severe shortage of memory chips, brought on at least in
part by well-intentioned, but misguided trade policy from Washington." [Ref.
ll:p. 79] If the U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Agreement of 1986 had not been
negotiated, market forces may have encouraged
Japanese chipmakers ... [to expand] . . . production to meet demand.
But instead, between August 1986 and August 1987, while demand rose
some 30%, MITI administered a 32% reduction in the output of the 256K
D-RAM, the then dominant memory chip. Japanese firms cut back
investment and shifted efforts from current-generation chips to the next
generation. [Ref. ll:p. 81]
If recent history has a lesson to tell, it may be that anti-dumping measures
may cause more problems than they solve. Anti-dumping policies tend to
single out a particular product or sector, rather than taking a big picture view
of an industry or the national economy. Again, anti-dumping policies are
short-term attempts to solve a long-term problem. Future consideration of
anti-dumping measures should include an in depth review of its effects on
related industries prior to implementation.
D. STRATEGIC STOCKPILING
One method suggested to alleviate the increasing dependence on foreign
sources of semiconductor products by the U.S. is through strategic stockpiling.
The U.S. already stockpiles strategic raw materials which its political and
military leaders feel would be essential to the execution of a large scale
military conflict. Some proponents of this method feel that,
Stockpiling foreign-made semiconductors may be one feasible answer to
the unlikely threat of interrupted supplies. Should the use of foreign
military components or demand for foreign military components or
demand for foreign goods seem to present a legitimate cause for worry,
domestic manufacturers could be designated as back-up suppliers in case
of a national emergency or mobilization. [Ref. 7:p. 52]
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In a method such as this, many questions arise. If a stockpiling policy is
adopted, what level of supply would be required to insure an uninterrupted
supply of semiconductors? Would the advancement of technology in the
semiconductor field make stockpiles obsolete quickly? What cost would a
stockpiling policy entail for the federal government and for the Department
of Defense?
As discussed in an earlier chapter, determination of the length of the next
war can only be based on speculation, hence, the required level of
semiconductors stockpiles can only be speculation. As advances in
semiconductor products are made, leading edge technology will most likely
make stockpiled semiconductor products obsolete in a number of years, if not
months. The U.S. strategy to maintain the technology lead to counter its
potential adversaries' numerical superiority would be at risk if it depended
on foreign suppliers to deliver state-of-the-art microchips. The cost of
renewing a stockpiled supply of semiconductors to prevent obsolescence,
coupled with the initial investment in stockpiles aimed at satisfying the need
for a conflict of reasonable duration appears to be quite excessive. Stockpiling
makes no attempt to solve the problem of maintaining the capability to
exploit new developments in semiconductors through increased R&D, but
only attempts to solve the short-term problem of an assured supply of
semiconductor chips.
For the first time in its modern history, the United States is likely to
have a defense industry which relies on foreign suppliers for items
ranging from armor plating to ceramics to semiconductors. As
dependence rises, pressure will inevitably be placed on the Defense
Department to expand the size and scope of its stockpiles. Stockpiling, in
turn, will draw resources from other budgetary items. [Ref. 25:p. 105]
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Economically, this method makes no attempt to solve the market
imperfection caused by the lack of concern for the public external benefits of
national security derived through advanced domestic production, but merely
attempts to apply a bandage at a significant, reoccurring cost to the federal
government.
E DOD PRODUCTION
Another option available to the federal government to insure a supply of
semiconductors for national security reasons would be through DOD itself
building manufacturing plants to produce semiconductors solely for defense
needs. The effects of this type of policy are very similar to those of strategic
stockpiling. DOD production also addresses the supply problem at the
exclusion of the R&D problem. One advantage to this method is that it
would give the federal government a high level of control for the production
of semiconductors.
On the other hand, there are a number of disadvantages including cost
overruns and lack of advanced technology expertise. For example, a related
government project, the Very High Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC)
program, "originally was planned to cost $200 million over 10 years. The
VHSIC budget has expanded to approximately $1 billion in order to
incorporate the technology into military systems." [Ref. 7:pp. 51-21
Government production could guarantee a secure supply of required
semiconductor chips capable of current technology at the time of plant
construction, but could not guarantee that the production would keep up
with advancing technology. Government production may be more
appropriate for industries and products which involve stable technologies.
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DOD production focuses exclusively on the Defense Department's
requirements for advanced technology weapon systems, while ignoring the
semiconductor industry as a whole. Economically, this option is flawed
because it encourages large government expenditures which only benefit the
military aspect of national security. This method of federal intervention fails
to address the problem of an alleged loss of advanced technology in the U.S.,
but only DOD's demand for semiconductors. At best, POD production would
again function as a bandage, when a major operation is required.
F. BUY AMERICAN POLICY
One means of restricting the purchase of foreign goods is through Buy
American restrictions. The Congress has enacted legislation which requires
federal agencies to only purchase products produced domestically even if they
cost up to 50% more. [Ref. 23:p. 7] Currently, North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) member countries are exempt from this policy, while
Japanese products are still discriminated against.
Unfortunately, even if the federal government did not exempt NATO
nations, their market power to make an impact on the world semiconductor
market would remain quite small. When Buy American rules were
instituted during the great depression of the 1930s, they could make an
impact. When DOD was the primary consumer for the semiconductor
industry, Buy American rules had a significant impact on foreign
competition. Since DOD today only accounts for roughly three percent of the
demand for merchant DRAM production output, Buy American rules are not
likely to play a significant role in reviving the U.S. DRAM semiconductor
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industry. Buy American restrictions, today, essentially only raise the level of
government expenditures. Even with a Buy American policy in place,
until recently, the Pentagon seemed unconcerned with the national-
security implications of foreign-produced electronics. To save costs or
reward allies, the Department of Defense (DOD) last year [1986] awarded
more than $9 billion in contracts to foreign firms—about 6 percent of total
procurement. [Ref. 7:p. 47]
This policy makes no attempt to solve causes of the problem, but
addresses only the symptoms. The prospect for Buy American restrictions
encouraging any meaningful improvement in the semiconductor industry is
grim.
G. SUBSIDIZED DOMESTIC PRODUCTION
In order for the government to protect one of its industries from foreign
competition, subsidies may be employed either to maintain the preeminence
of a domestic industry over foreign competition or simply to level the
competitive playing field that may be in favor of a competitive foreign
industry.
Economists tend to favor this form of federal intervention because it
treats the market failure, rather than merely applying a bandage to the
symptoms of the market failure. Because the commercial semiconductor
market does not recognize the external benefits of national security derived
from maintaining a lead in advanced semiconductor technology, subsidies
would tend to encourage the semiconductor industry to produce those
products which are subsidized.
In the semiconductor industry, for example, some have recommended
that government subsidies be granted to domestic producers of DRAM
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semiconductors to counter the growing U.S. dependence on foreign sources
for state-of-the-art semiconductors. DRAMs, however, are not state-of-the-art
technology. Even if they were, vertically integrated computer companies in
the U.S., such as IBM and AT&T, would be capable of supplying the Defense
Department with the DRAMs necessary in a military crisis. [Ref. 13:p. 11]
The Defense Department's demand for microchips today is primarily for
customized chips which have few commercial applications. Subsidies
designed to offset the asymmetrical costs of foreign competitors and aimed at
the DRAM market would do little to stimulate the market for high-
performance semiconductors required for national security considerations.
To summarize,
From a commercial point of view, DOD could better strengthen the
industry by helping consolidate the U.S. lead in low-volume, high-
performance products. This approach would also make sense militarily
since weapons and other DOD applications generally require custom
designs produced in low volumes. [Ref. 7:p. 50]
Subsidies for semiconductor products do address the external benefit of
national security. However, to be most effective, they should target those
products most important to DOD. In order to target a specific product or
industry, general subsidies are not required nor desired. Specific subsidies
aimed at DRAMs for example, would have the same limited effect as Buy
American restrictions, because of the relatively small size of DOD's demand,
and have the same drawbacks for their employment.
H. CONSORTIA
The formation of consortia is one method used for market correction
which has become increasingly popular in recent years. Consortia are
52
organizations of firms with common interests which pool their resources to
provide advantages to their member firms. Their popularity in the U.S., of
late, reflects their apparent success in Japan.
Historically, "because U.S. firms have acted independently, each company
is burdened with the full costs of advancing every aspect of new technologies.
In an era of rapidly increasing costs of technology development, independent
and duplicated efforts hinder competitiveness." [Ref. 15:p. 2] Unfortunately,
"the concept of a consortium is still an alien idea here." [Ref. 32:p. f-15]
The Japanese have effectively used consensus and negotiation as a
methodology for solving technical problems. In contrast, American
industry has often been built on adversarial and contractual
relationships. [Ref. 15:p. 18]
In the past, U.S. semiconductor firms have not supported cooperative
research in the early phases of process and materials development. This
adversarial atmosphere created inefficiency, redundancy, and even the
misapplication of equipment, and it limited the financial resources
applied to any single effort to those that could be borne by a single firm.
[Ref. 15:p. 20]
Another drawback is the tendency among U.S. firms which participate in
consortia to hold back their most competent and promising researchers and
ideas out of concern for the potential benefits their competitors may derive.
[Ref. 33:p. 11] This is particularly true for consortia involving markets where
some firms have significant, independent research activities while others
have little or no independent research. The members who have significant
independent investments are reluctant to join for fear that their competitors
will benefit from their independent efforts.
For years, the formation of consortia was prohibited in the U.S. because
their formation violated various anti-trust laws. Recently, the federal
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government has begun to loosen certain anti-trust laws. Examples of
semiconductor consortia that have been formed are the Microelectronics and
Computer Technology Corporation (MCC) and the Semiconductor
Manufacturing Technology (Sematech). MCC was formed completely as a
private sector endeavor. Sematech, however, is funded cooperatively with
the government. A more recent attempt to form a consortium, US
Memories, failed even before it was established because of a lack of financial
commitment from its prospective members.
While some proponents of semiconductor industry consortia believe that
a one third cost savings is possible for microelectronic technology firms
which participate in R&D consortia, there are many that oppose the consortia
concept. [Ref. 34:p. 20] Many who oppose the formation of consortia feel that
because the semiconductor industry was built by brazen entrepreneurs, the
same approach should continue. They cite problems with attracting the best
researchers and the best ideas. There is speculation that even among
consortia members, one motivation for joining the consortium lies in
hedging their bets in case any new breakthrough technologies are developed.
The success of consortia in the U.S. has yet to be determined. While there
are many reasons why the concept may not work, there is also potential for its
success. Using government support for consortia, such as Sematech, is
justified if the external benefits derived from its success are sufficient to offset
the costs. This option is capable of stimulating R&D in the semiconductor
industry if it could be employed properly, but it is unclear at present whether
either Sematech or MCC have developed the proper framework. Consortia
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addresses at least one of the problems of the semiconductor industry,
inefficient market structure, rather than just the symptoms.
L SUMMARY
The options discussed in this chapter, which target specific sectors such as
the semiconductor industry, have had varying degrees of success. All have
been employed in numerous cases with a wide range of results. A micro
approach might be used to attempt to solve the semiconductor industry's
problem, but serious consideration must be given to macro policies which
tend to stimulate the economy as a whole.
The concluding chapter will include possible macro government
economic policies designed to stimulate the entire economy rather than
targeting specific industries as do the options discussed in this chapter.
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V. CONCLUSION
As discussed in the previous chapter, several options are available to the
federal government to stimulate the semiconductor industry. Although the
U.S. semiconductor industry appears to suffer from competitive
disadvantages when compared to the Japanese semiconductor industry, these
disadvantages appear to affect the economy as a whole, not just the
semiconductor industry. While micro solutions may have a positive effect
on a single industry such as the U.S. semiconductor industry, the potential for
detrimental effects on related industries is a very real possibility, like the
results from the U.S.-Japan semiconductor pact of 1986. Furthermore, some
micro solutions may evoke retaliatory responses from our trading partners.
Since the lack of competitiveness fcr the U.S. semiconductor industry appears
to have been caused by macro effects on the economy, it would seem
reasonable that a more practical, long-term solution involving macro policies
would better solve the semiconductor industry's problems. These policies
would address the actual causes of the current problems and affect the
economy as a whole, rather than just one specific part. Thus, these policies
would address both the military and economic dimensions of the national
security issue.
Earlier in this thesis, the reasons for Japan's competitive edge in business
were discussed. Some of those reasons include the lower cost of capital,
protectionism policies, industry structure, educational system effectiveness,
and cultural biases.
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A number of macro policies are available to stimulate this overall
economy. While a complete discussion of these policy options fall outside
the scope of this thesis, a brief discussion is included.
The cost of capital in the U.S. could be reduced debt if were discouraged
and savings encouraged. For example, if the federal deficit were reduced or
eliminated, it would significantly reduce the demand for capital and interest
rates. Conversely, the supply of capital could be increased by encouraging
personal savings through changing tax laws to increase deductions for
Individual Retirement Accounts and eliminating double taxation of personal
savings accounts. Finally, capital investment could be further encouraged by
reinstituting investment tax credits for business investment and by reducing
capital gains taxes.
The U.S. industry structure could be allowed to become more vertically
integrated to more readily compete with the large Japanese conglomerates
and Japanese consortia by relaxing anti-trust laws. At present, IBM and AT&T
are restricted from entering the merchant DRAM markets because of such
laws.
Scholarship programs could be offered to stimulate interest in scientific
and engineering disciplines at all levels of education to recover the lead so
important to the U.S. technological superiority of the last few decades.
While the Japanese have been very successful with their business
approach, differences in Eastern and Western culture prevent the Japanese
business culture from being as successful when applied to American business
as it is in Oriental cultures. Adopting certain Japanese style business
approaches which would complement the American business culture, rather
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than just copying the Japanese because they have been successful, could pay
big dividends in international business and trade.
A RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN THE
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
Since the U.S. has come to depend on high-tech components for its
weapons systems to counter the threat of its numerically superior potential
adversaries, a reliable supply of semiconductor products is vital to the
military aspect of its national security. While macro policies appear to be the
best approach to solving this problem, they will take time to be enacted and to
take effect. Problems such as the high cost of investment capital in the U.S.
and the decline in the U.S. educational system cannot be solved in the short-
term.
At this critical crossroads, the U.S. cannot afford to wait until long-term
policies take effect because the lack of a reliable source of the most advanced
semiconductor products for weapons systems could open a window of
vulnerability for its national security. To conclude the research and analysis
of this thesis, two areas of recommendations are offered. First, short-term
recommendations are made to minimize the U.S. window of vulnerability.
Second, long-term recommendations to solve the macro problems of foreign
competitiveness are made.
For the short-term, it is recommended that the U.S. government institute
a policy where the DOD would contract with a large number of foreign
suppliers in order to obtain the most advanced technology and to minimize
the risk of interruption of supplies. The chance of an interruption of critical
supplies in time of national or military crisis would be minimized by
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employing widely diversified sources of supply. This policy would also tend
to be the most cost effective because the current cost of capital for U.S. based
R&D and capital investment would make fostering a domestic DRAM
industry expensive. These funds could probably be used more effectively
elsewhere.
For the long-term, it is recommended that the U.S. government employ a
number of macro policies to stimulate an improved competitive
environment for American business. First, fiscal responsibility in the federal
budget process should receive a much higher priority in order to eliminate
the federal deficit and reduce the federal debt. This will serve to reduce
interest rates making investment in R&D and other areas much more
affordable for American business.
Second, in order to encourage more business investment, the federal
government should consider reinstituting the investment tax credit. This
would serve to attract more investment funds and make American business
more competitive with foreign firms.
In order to compete with large, vertically integrated firms such as those in
Japan, a national policy to loosen anti-trust laws is recommended. Since
many merchant semiconductor chip producers in the U.S. are so restricted in
their markets, short-term fluctuations in market demand are often
devastating to their profitability. By allowing companies to vertically
integrate, the different segments of their business can absorb market
fluctuations more readily. Considering the level of international
competition, relaxing anti-trust laws is unlikely to lead to excessive market
power in U.S. markets.
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It is recommended that a national policy of increased emphasis on
education be instituted to help bring the U.S. back to preeminence in the
science and engineering fields. While U.S. colleges are still at the forefront of
worldwide education, the quality of primary and secondary education, to
prepare students for college, has declined in recent years. Many foreign
students are filling a void in U.S. college classrooms in the science and
engineering fields because American students either are not qualified to
attend or because they have no desire to attain a technical education. "While
our educational system has concentrated on educating talented students in
theoretical disciplines, it has neglected training for manufacturing. In
addition, manufacturing industries have been slow to communicate their
needs to institutions of higher education." [Ref. 15:p. 17] Perhaps scholarship
programs to stimulate more participation in technical curricula along with
more government supported research at the college level would be
appropriate.
An important effect of a more competitive business environment for the
semiconductor industry is the improved potential for increasing the market
share for consumer electronics. Improved profitability for producers of
consumer products will free additional capital for future investment in
advanced consumer semiconductor products which very well may have
military applications to further enhance U.S. national security.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
The limited scope of this thesis precluded the further study of a number
of issues. Several areas where continued research and study may be of
interest are:
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What are realistic defense scenarios for the future? How will the U.S.
determine future demand for semiconductor resupply in each
scenario? How do differences in the scale of the conflict (small versus
large) and duration (short-term versus long-term) affect the answers?
What are the opportunity costs of maintaining self-sufficiency in the
semiconductor industry? How long can the U.S. afford these costs?
To what extent are Japan and other foreign suppliers dependent on the
U.S.? Is a cut off of critical items likely?
To what extent does the U.S. depend on foreign suppliers of
manufactured goods (specifically semiconductors and eletronics) to
meet critical defense needs? Where are these imported products used?
Is diversity of foreign suppliers for critical semiconductor technology a
realistic solution to the current economic and national security
problems? How much diversity (number and capacity) would be
sufficient to minimize the national security risk at an acceptable cost?
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